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action. When we take the poInt of view of any
particular reflective. rational agent. Gewirth
argues. we can see how that agent logically must
accept the view that others are as worthy of moral
concern as she believes herself to be. (Of course. he
does not claim that agents all actually go through the
steps of the argument which follows. He is offering
a rational reconstruction. not a psychological
thesis,)
First. the reflective agent can see that action of
any kind has two necessary preconditions or
"generic features": (1) the ability to have purposes
or goals, and (2) the freedom which is required to
pursue those goals. In order to have goals, one must
in turn be alive. have a certain minimal quality of
life, and have certain basic mental and physical
capabilities. Gewirth combines these requirements
for the first generic feature of action under the
heading of "well-being." 5 Thus. the reflective agent
who wants to pursue her goals must also value her
well-being and freedom. and hold that they are good:

Philosopher Alan Gewirth holds that refleclive,
rational agents are logically compelled to accept and
respeclthe rights of others.' I have argued that his
reasoning implies that both so-called "marginal"
humans and many nonhuman animals must be included
in the sphere of morally considerable beings. 2 Frank
De Roose has taken issue with Gewirth's purported
justification of morality in his recent article,
"Pluhar on Methods of Justification." 3
Citing
several other critics of Gewirth, De Roose argues
that logic does not dictate the shift from agency to
moral agency. I shall argue here that this critique of
Gewirth is mistaken, although it is quite true that
logic, in an important sense, is not a guarantee of
morality.
Let us begin with a brief sketch of Gewirth's line
of reasoning. Moral codes are action guides and must
be understood within the context of agency. Only
agents, who (j) are able to control their own
behavior, (ii) have knowledge of the relevant
proximate circumstances of their actions, and (iii)
have purposes they wish to fulfill,4 are capable of
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"My freedom and well-being are necessary
[i.e .• are required for action in pursuit of
goals l goods." 6
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Note that Gewirth i~ not claiming that the agent'~
freedom and well-being are good; his point is that the
reneelive agent must !lQlQ.them, as generic features
of aelion, to be good, Even a self-destruelive agent
contemplating suicide must value the freedom and
well-being needed at that moment to carry out her
purpose.
The agent's realization that her freedom and
well-being are requirements for the achievement of
her goals leads her to prescribe that

~hifl from the prudential to the moral point of view,
according to which others' interests count too,
begins with the agent's justification of the rights
claim made in (3). As Gewirth points out, rightsclaims, as opposed to bald demands. are claims that
one is entitled to or Qy§, certain behavior on the part
of others; hence, they need to be warranted. II The
agent who refleels on her rights-claim realizes that
it is warranted by the simple fael that she has
purposes she wants to fulfill; i.e., she is "a
prospeelive purposive agent." This is the most
basic "practical justifying reason" which can ever
be given. As one who wishes to act. she must claim
or advocate that she is entitled to the conditions
which make aelion possible. Thus. she accepts

(2) "I must have freedom and well-being."?

This prescriptive claim in turn leads the agent to
claim that she is entitled to freedom and well-being:
(3) '"

(5)

have rights to freedom and well-being."S

Note once again that Gewirth is not arguing that the
agent ~ these fundamental, "generic," rights; he
is saying that she ~ or accepts that she does. as
an agent who wishes to pursue her goals.
Gewirth uses an indireel proof to show that the
agent logically must claim these generic rights for
herself. If she were to deny (3), she would also
have to deny that

The next stage In the shift from the prudential to the
moral point of view comes with the acceptance of the
principle of universalizability:
(6) "If the having of some quality Q is a sufficient
condition of some predicate P's belonging to
some individual S. then P must also belong to
all other subjects that have Q." 13

(4) "All other persons ought at least to refrain
from removing or Interfering with my
freedom and well-being." 9

It follows. Gewirth argues, that
(7) "All prospective purposive agents have rights
to freedom and well-being." 1'1

But if she denies (4). the agent must accept the
following substitute premise:
(4')

This is a moral claim, not merely a prudential one,
because it implies that others besides oneself are
entitled to have their freedom and well-being
respected. It grounds what Gewirth calls "The
Supreme Principle of Morality":

"Others persons may (i.e" it is permissible
that other persons) remove or Interfere with
my freedom and well-being." 10

However, (4') contradiels (2):
"I must have
freedom and well-being." Since the agent ID.!! agent
must accept (2). she must then deny (4'). Since (4')
follows from the rejection of (3), the agent must
then claim that she has rights to the preconditions
for agency,
No. so far the agent has not made a moral claim.
The normative claim in (3) is prudential. because it
concerns the furthering of her interests alone. The
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"I have rights to freedom and well-being
because , am a prospective purposive
agent." 12

(8) "Act in accord with the generic rights of your
recipients as well as of yourself.
(the
Principle of Generic Consistency [PGCJ)15
It

<AJr sketch of Gewirth's argument is now
complete: If he is right. reflective agents are
compelled by no less than logical consistency to take
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seemingly fatal flaw:

the moral point of view. Gewirth's reasoning has
enormously important implications. It implies that
the rational agent logically must accord (prima facie)
rights of freedom and well-being to every individual
who has purposes he or she wants to fulfill. I have
argued elsewhere that even those agents who are
intellectually incapable of reasoning through the
steps which lead to the PGC must have these rights
accorded to them.lf> Agents who cannot be moral
agents require the preconditions of agency in order
to act, just as intellectually better endowed agents
do. It follows that many animals. namely those who
exhibit what Tom Regan has called "preference
autonomy," J 7 would also logically have to be
accorded rights. 18
Finally, beings who have
preferences but lack the mental or physical ability to
satisfy them, would at least have to be accorded the
right to well-being, even though their freedom might
have to be limited for their own and others'
protection, 19 Very young or "marginal" humans
would thus also be morally considerable. Agents who
deliberately refuse to hold that these others have
rights are guilty of the most glaring logical fallacy of
all. if Gewirth's line of reasoning is correct: selfcontradiction.
But ~ Gewirth's line of reasoning correct? Many
objectIons have been raIsed against It. Gewirth
anticipated and answered most of these objections
himself in Reason and Morality. Some additional
objections have been raised against it by critics and
addressed by Gewirth In the most recent book on his
Ylews,20 Frank De Roose has now argued that
although Gewirth has indeed correctly shown that
reflective agents must claim the rights to freedom
and well-being for themselves, he has not shown that
agents must hold that others have these rights. 21
Paraphrasing R.M. Hare, De Roose charges that
Gewirth is himself guilty of a logical fallacy: the
equivocation of "having a right" with "claIming a
right. .. 22 From the "relatively uncontroversial"
thesis that every reflective agent must claim rights
for herself. De Roose charges, Gewirth moves. via
the (also presumably uncontroversiaJ) principle of
universalizability. to "all prospective agents who
have purposes they want to fulfill have the rights of
freedom and well-being." 23 De Roose quotes an
early critic of Gewirth. Adina Schwartz. on this
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Gewirth has only shown that each agent
must claim rights for him/herself on
prudential grounds. Therefore, each agent
is only logically bound to admit that all
other agents have sound prudential reasons
for claiming those same rights for
themselves. 2<1
Recognizing that others claim the rights to freedom
and well-being is not tantamount to accQrding them
those rights. Hence, the rational agent is not
inconsistent if she refuses to take the moral point of
view.
De Roose points out that R.M. Hare later pressed
much the same objection:
For if all he had shown was that an agent
must claim that there is a prudential
requirement on him to seek the necessary
conditions for achieving ~ purposes, the
universalization of this claim would only
yield the claim that there is a prudential
requirement on other similar agents in
similar situations to seek the necessary
conditions for achieving 1!lllli: purposes. 25
Clearly, the latter claim is not moral at all; it is as
resoundingly prudential as the claim from which it
was universalized.
The charge that Gewirth has failed to bridge the
gap between prudence and morality, pressed by
Schwartz, Hare, and De Roose, is actually mistak.en.
However. in his reply to Hare,26 Gewlrth fails to
show that he can escape that charge. He agrees with
Hare that (a) "there is a prudential requirement on
Ian agent] to seek the necessary conditions for
achieving
his
purposes"
enlails
(assuming
universalizability), (b) "there is a prudential
requirement on other similar agents to seek the
necessary conditions for achieving .tlWr. purposes."
He then argues that (b). when said by the agent
referred to in (8), is actually a moral judgment.
because it "lakes favorable account of the interests
of persons other than or in addition to [the original
agent!. "27 But this cannot be made out. An agent
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who ~ay~ that it i5 in the intere~t5 of other agent~ to
seek freedom and well-being takes neither favorable
nor unfavorable account of the interests of those
other agents; he or she simply makes an observation.
Hitler, while no doubt realiZing that it was in the
interests of his death camp victims to have freedom
and well-being, was not exactly "taking favorable
account" of their interests whenever this thought
occurred to him!
Gewirth, in trying to hoist Hare on his own
prudential petard, concedes too much In accepting
Hare's framework for discussion. He takes a step in
the right direction when he stresses the importance
of taking the agent's standpoint, but he does not put
this step in the correct context. The claim to be
universalized is the agent's. not an outside
observer's description of the agent's claim. Hare
(and Schwartz before him) assumes that "the agent
claims the rights of freedom an well-beIng for
herself on prudential grounds" must be Gewirth's
prudential starting point on his path to the moral
point of view, This starting point can indeed not be
universalized into a moral claim. However, the
actual claim to be universalized Is the agent's claim
that "I have the rights to freedom and well-being
because I am a prospective purposive agent" (step 5
in our earlier sketch of Gewirth's argument). When
this claim is universalized we get step 7:
"all
prospective purposive agents have the rights to
freedom and well-being." This is a moral judgment
because, by making it. the agent thereby accords
rights to others. She does not merely observe that
others illim. rights to freedom ~nd well-being
because it is in their interests to do 50. The novelty
and force of Gewirth's argument is due to his
insistence that we take the agent's standpoint
throughout. He does not need to show that the
original agent has rights or that all agents have
rights: he need only show that the renective agent
must hold that she has rights. Once he has shown
this (and De Roose himself calls this step "relatively
uncontroversial" ). universalization leads to the
agent's holdina that others with purposes they want
to fulfill also have rights. The critics' mistake Is to
confuse the agent's claim with someone else's report
of that claim.
De Roose's formulation of the objection allows us
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to 5ee thi~ mi~take more clearly. He grants that
Gewirth shows that "all (renectivel agents must
claim for themselves the right to freedom and wellbeing, " The agent, then, is said to judge that "I
claim for myself rights to freedom and well-being."
He rightly argues that "From (thisl judgment ... one
can with the help of the logical principle of
universalizability only infer a universalized
prudential judgment and not a moral judgment," 28
presumably the judgment that "other prospective
agents similar to myself claim rights of freedom and
well-being for themselves." But this misidentifies
the judgment to be universalized. The statement that
"all (renectivel agents must claim for themselves
rights to freedom and well-being" does not imply
that the agent thinks to herself "I claim the rights to
freedom and well-being." This adds an extra layer
of renection which need not at all be present. One
claims the rights to freedom and well-being for
oneself by saying or thinking "I have the rights to
freedom and well-being." This statement is the
rights-claim in question! Claiming a right and having
a right are indeed two different matters. Since the
agent must hold that she has rights, by Gewirth's
argument, not merely that she claims rights, the
judgment to be universalized is '" [on the grounds
that I am a prospective purposive agent) have the
rights to freedom and well-being." Gewirth does not
commit the fallacy of equivocating "having a right"
and "claiming aright" at all. On the contrary, the
contention that "S claims rights" entails that S must
think '" claim rights" commits the intentional
fallacy. The third-person report of the agent's
judgment is illicitly imported into the judgment
itself. Gewirth's reasoning! therefore. has not been
refuted by the objection Schwartz, Hare, and De
Roose have raised. Unless he can be shown mistaken
in some other respect. Gewirth appears to have
shown that the rational, renective agent logically
must hold that others in addition to herself have
basic moral rights,
Unfortunately, the above does not imply that
agents with normal mental capacities will respect
the rights of others. De Roose is skeptical of
Gewirth"s claim that "the transition from the
prudential to the moral and social is . . . not
motivational but logical." 29 Even if Gewirth. as I
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prudenttal, point of view for a very long time. 35
Psychology is needed to provide the answers, if
indeed there are any.
Hume anticipated
psychologists when he argued that "feeling" rather
than reason alone leads us to make moral
distinctions. 30 While we may doubt the mechanism
he proposes for the operation of "the moral sense,"
it is difficult to deny that feeling has a central role.
Simply put, caring about others motivates our moral
concern for them. Psychologists who study moral
development have amassed much evidence for the
caring trait; it begins to appear almost as early as
one's concern for oneself does.
Jerome Kagan
argues that empathy, the ability to imagine oneself in
another's place, normally appears around the second
year of life regardless of one's cullure. and it
immediately reveals itself in some of the child's
actions .37 Lawrence Kohlberg places the development of II caring orientation in childhood as well. 38
We do not refrain from torturing innocenls simply
because to do so violates rights which we are
logically compelled to grant: we refrain because we
are emotionally incapable of innicting undeserved
agony, We do not need to read Gewirth to become
convinced that we should try to help starving humans
in Ethiopia; seeing their tortured, hopeless eyes and
emaciated bodies is quite sufficient to spur our
action. Nor do we need to reason to the PGC to
realize that veal calves, for example, are tortured
innocents. and lhat to eat lhem is an abomination. In
short, we do care about others. This is, apparently,
a trait we share with many nonhuman animals. 39
Human immoralists and amoralists have somehow
fallen short or been "arrested," as a psychologist
might say, in their moral development.
Why, then. rely upon reason in moral matters?
Why not trust our feelings instead? Conceptualizing
the PGC is not necessary for us to taKe the moral
point of view, /Snd those who refuse to go beyond
prudence are, one might hold. not going to find it
sufficient. Must we not try to reach their emotions
instead? Do not tears win more moral battles than
appeals to consistency?
Perhaps they do. but the sad fact is that reliance
upon feelings alone has led to many a moral
abomination. Bigots are filled with fervent and
totally illogical conviction.
To very loosely

have argued. has successfully shown that
consistency requires ttle agent to hold that others
have rights. skepticism about the moral behaavior of
agents is warranted.
The agent must also be
motivated or inclined to abide by the dictates of
reason. She may be perfectly able to see that others
have the rights that she claims for herself, and yet
refuse to respect them. Plato notwithstanding. one
may knowingly do evil: immoralists can exist.
Gewirth raises a form of this objection himself.
If. as David Hume has claimed, reason alone can
compel to action. what else can motivate the agent to
act morally? Why should the agent who realizes that
she is logically committed to the rights of others lli
50 as to respect those rlghts?30 Gewirth's answer
here is that the agent "rationally must accept the
PGC because it is entailed by another judgment he
accepts."31 He adds that "by virtue of the PGC's
being rationally justlfled. the ratlonal agent Is in fact
motivated to accept it, since, being rational, he
accepts what is rationally justified." 2
Well and
good, but not all agents are thoroughgoingly rational.
That is precisely the problem! Gewirth's reply
plainly leaves any immoralists unscathed.
Another group of problematic agents reject
reason at an even earlier point than immoralists.
They, while fully belieVing that they are entitled to
rights to freedom and well-being, refuse to
universalize beyond their own cases. These are the
amoralists.
Gewirth has devoted considerable
attention to this group. beloved by critics such as
Hare ,33 He succeeds in showing that the critics err
in their claim that amoralists do not contradict
themselves. Nevertheless, amoralists exist; logic
does not overpower their lack of concern for others.
The bad news (and not just for teachers of logic)
is that agents are very frequently illogical. A
number of social scientists recently have conducted
studies which indicate that illogical. inconsistent
processing of information is extremely common}"
In view of this depressing fact, how can one expect
agents not to be amoralists or immoralists? Why
should they care about anyone other than
themselves?
These Questions are hardly new; as De Roose
observes, we have been seeking the motivation for
taking the moral. as opposed to the exclusively
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pllrllphrll~e

ImmllnueJ Klint, rell~on without emotion
may be impotent, but emotion without reason is
blind. Without reason, although it is not a guarantee,
one has little chance of avoiding delusion, prejudice,
and arbitrariness.
Anyone to whom truth and
fairness is important should acknowledge the
immense value of rationality. Properly understood,
reason should inspire our passionate devotion.
Herein lies the great value of Gewirlh's
enterprise. He has shown that what many of us
almost automatically feel to be true--that individuals
who care about what happens to them have just as
much right to freedom and well-being as we do--can
be justified in the most stringent way. Some ears
may well be deaf to the twin appeals of reason and
emotion, but others can be reached. More than this
we cannot ask.
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